BANGLADESH
Human rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
1.Introduction
Amnesty International welcomes the peace accord in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts as a major step towards the resolution of a situation
which had resulted in serious human rights violations in the past. It is high
time now for the Government of Bangladesh and the Chittagong Hill Tracts
authorities to act decisively to ensure that any abuse of power on the part of
law enforcement personnel is prevented and that victims of past and present
human rights violations receive truth, justice and redress. All sections of
Bangladesh society should cooperate in efforts to build respect for human rights
after years of gross abuses.
The tribal people of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts have for over two decades been the targets of massacres, arbitrary
detention, torture and extrajudicial executions(1). They must now be assured
that their fundamental human rights will be respected. There is a strong need
for the establishment of institutions and mechanisms that promote and protect
the rights of the people, that ensure respect for people's fundamental human
rights by the police and local bodies, and that enable the people to invoke
appropriate procedures to seek redress for human rights violations. To that end,
it is imperative that the government undertakes a thorough review of the law
enforcement mechanisms and judicial processes to remove any biases against the
rights of the tribal people. At the same time, the National Human Rights
Commission should as a matter of priority be established and receive adequate
resources to monitor the human rights situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
and recommend appropriate action.
A culture of violence in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts, developed during years of armed confrontation, has allowed human
rights violations to be committed in the majority of cases with impunity. The
main perpetrators have been the law enforcement personnel and groups close to
the army within the Bengalis settlers, while the armed opposition has also been
responsible for instances of human rights abuse. Serious efforts are therefore
needed to combat this legacy. To that end, it is imperative that past human
rights violations are addressed without delay. Amnesty International recommends
that the Government of Bangladesh and the Chittagong Hill Tracts authorities
establish a special commission to conduct far reaching inquiries into all
incidents of past human rights violations ensuring that they are all
investigated fully, independently, impartially and competently. The aim should
be to identify those who were involved in abusing human rights during the armed
conflict - be they in the army, in the police forces or in the former armed
opposition - so that they can be brought to justice.
The most complex and
difficult phase in any situation is peace-building in the early years after a
conflict has ended. This requires a coordinated approach in which local,
national, regional and international aid, development, humanitarian and human
rights bodies all invest in nurturing civil society and rebuilding the
institutions that guarantee the rule of law. When such guarantors of human
rights are strong, it is less likely that a region emerging from conflict will
again descend into it. Such efforts need to include the development of a fair
and impartial judicial system, the provision of human rights training for the
law enforcement personnel, for the judiciary, and for the society at
large.
In Amnesty International's view, peace building in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts requires lasting cooperation from all sections of the Bangladesh
society, including government institutions, the ruling and the opposition
parties, prominent personalities, parliamentarians, intellectuals, professionals
and notables of local communities.
The signing of the accord without
outside mediation was an important achievement for both the Bangladesh
Government and the tribal representatives. However, an Amnesty International
delegation visiting the Chittagong Hill Tracts in May 1999 to assess the human
rights situation there found that some of its main provisions had not been fully
implemented. These included the rehabilitation of all returned refugees,
settlement of land confiscated from the tribal people, and withdrawal of
non-permanent army camps from the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Now, over two years
on, these promises still remain only partially fulfilled.
This report
covers the current human rights situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the
aftermath of the peace accord. It provides appropriate background information as
well as recommendations to ensure adherence to, and respect for, human rights
principles. It is based on the finding of the afore-mentioned delegation and
other information which the organization has gathered in the past
year.
2. Historical background
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
in southeastern Bangladesh covers an area of approximately 5,093 square miles,
about 10 per cent of the total land area of Bangladesh. It borders India to the
north and Myanmar (Burma) to the east. It consists of several valleys running in
a northwest to south easterly direction, with ridges rising to 3,000 feet. This
upland, forested area is in stark contrast to the landscape of other parts of
Bangladesh, which is flat and subject to regular monsoon flooding. The area is
relatively rich in natural resources, with fruit growing there in abundance.
There is also timber, bamboo and gas, and possibilities for oil exploration have
been actively pursued in recent years.
Prior to the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971, the population of the area consisted almost entirely of
people from 13 different indigenous tribes.(2) The tribal people who differ
significantly from the majority population of Bangladesh are of Sino-Tibetan
descent, have a distinctive appearance with Mongoloid features and are
predominantly Buddhists, with small numbers of Hindus. They differ
linguistically and in their social organization, marriage customs, birth and
death rites, food, agriculture techniques and other social and cultural customs
from the people of the rest of the country.
Under a special status during
the British rule of the sub-continent, migration to the area was virtually
prohibited and the area enjoyed limited self-government. As part of Pakistan,
the Chittagong Hill Tracts lost its special status and autonomy under an
amendment to the Pakistan Constitution in 1963. Pressure for land to cultivate
had in the past led to the migration of large numbers of non-tribal people from
other parts of Bangladesh into the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This process was
actively encouraged by governments since the 1960s.
In December 1971,
Bangladesh became independent after a nine-month civil war between the Pakistan
army and the insurgency known as Mukti Bahini (liberation forces) led by
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Some influential figures in the tribal population
supported Pakistan while others complained of being excluded from participation
in the war of independence. This nonetheless created the perception that the
tribal people were against the independence of Bangladesh.
The origin of
the problems in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is believed to be the completion of a
dam at Kaptai near Rangamati between 1957 and 1963 when the area was
administered by Pakistan. At least 54,000 acres of settled cultivable land,
mostly farmed by the Chakma tribe, were lost in 1957 when the government began
the construction of the Karnaphuli hydroelectric project. Over 400 square miles
of land were submerged with far-reaching effects on the economy and life-style
of the tribal people there. Some 100,000 people lost their homes and prime
agricultural lands. Compensation for lost land was inadequate and over 40,000
Chakma tribals crossed the border into India where the majority have sought
Indian citizenship.
At the same time, the Pakistan Government announced
its intention to open up the area for economic development and encouraged poor
Bengali families to settle there. This policy was even more vigorously pursued
by the Bangladesh Government. Conflict over land together with the threat of
assimilation into the majority culture of Bangladesh, provided the background to
the armed conflict.
In February 1972, a tribal delegation called on Prime
Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to accept four basic demands: autonomy for the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, together with provisions for a separate legislative
body; retention of the provision of the 1900 Regulation in the Bangladesh
Constitution which allowed a form of self government; the continuation of the
offices of the traditional tribal chiefs; a constitutional provision restricting
amendment of the 1900 Regulation; and the imposition of a ban on the influx of
non-tribals into the area.
These demands were rejected, and the 1972
Constitution of Bangladesh made no provision for any special status for the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. On 7 March 1972 Manobendra Narayan Larma, together with
his bother Bodhi Priyo Larma, formed Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati
Samiti (PCJSS - the Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Solidarity
Association).
Its armed wing, Shanti Bahini (peace force) was also
formed in 1972, although it did not become militarily active until mid-1970s
when it began to attack military and paramilitary personnel and their bases in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as well as non-tribal settlers, resulting in
hundreds of deaths and the abduction of foreign nationals for ransom
money.
Violent army operations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts began in
March 1980 when it was reported that 22 soldiers were ambushed by the Shanti
Bahini in the village of Kaukhali west of Rangamati where Bengali families
were being resettled. The army retaliated by deliberately firing on two groups
of unarmed tribal people killing a number of villagers after they were ordered
to line up.(3) From then on, Bengali settlers began to attack the tribal people
apparently at the instigation of the army or in conjunction with the operations
of army personnel. The army reportedly recruited armed groups known as Village
Defence Parties (VDP - also called village defence police) from the new settlers
and provided them with firearms to resist the Shanti Bahini. Official
figures indicate that more than 8,500 rebels, soldiers and civilians have been
killed during two decades of insurgency. The number of civilians killed is
estimated at 2,500.
3. Efforts to settle the
conflict
Successive governments in Bangladesh initiated dialogue with
various groups representing the tribal people of the CHT to explore solutions to
the conflict. These at times resulted in limited agreements between the two
sides. One such agreement reached in 1985 between the Government of General
Ershad and a breakaway faction of the PCJSS headed by Priti Kumar Chakma - known
generally as the ''Priti Faction'' - resulted in the surrender of some 300
''Priti Faction'' fighters who accepted a rehabilitation package offered by the
government, but was rejected by the PCJSS headed by JB Larma.(4)
Further
meetings between General Ershad's Government and a committee representing
elements from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, resulted in the establishment of three
district elected councils in Rangamati, in Khagrachari and in Bandarban, each
composed of a two-thirds tribal majority with a tribal chairperson. The
councils, which continue to function, have limited administrative and
supervisory authority over a number of government departments including
Fisheries, Agriculture, Small and Cottage Industries, Public Health and Primary
Education.
In May 1992, at the end of a visit to India by Prime Minister
Begum Khaleda Zia, the two governments in a joint declaration stated their
commitment to a speedy repatriation of tribal refugees to the Chittagong Hill
Tracts. In July that year the Government of Begum Khaleda Zia constituted a
nine-member committee headed by a cabinet minister to make recommendations to
the government on how to resolve the conflict. The committee was active until
early 1996. There has been no public information about any recommendations the
committee may have made.
In August 1992, PCJSS declared a unilateral
cease-fire for three months which remained in force indefinitely until the
signing of the peace accord.
The Government of Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina which assumed office in June 1996 following general elections,
established a committee in October that year chaired by the Chief Whip of the
Bangladesh National Assembly to work out a solution to the conflict in
Chittagong Hill Tracts. The 12-member committee was made up of parliamentarians
from the ruling Awami League, the opposition BNP and Jatiya Party, retired
government officials and other professionals. The first meeting between the
National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts and the leaders of the PCJSS was
held in December 1996. Other meetings followed and on 2 December 1997, an
agreement generally known as the ''Peace Accord'' was signed between the
National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Parbhatia Chttagram Jana
Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) in the presence of highest government authorities in
Bangladesh. It required changes in Bangladesh law to enable the formation of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council, a body with a range of autonomous
responsibilities.
However, at least three smaller political groups in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, namely the Hill Students Council, the Hill Peoples
Council and the Hill Women Federation challenged the right of the PCJSS to be
the sole representative of the tribal people and sign the accord on their
behalf.
4. The peace accord
The most salient feature of the
Accord is the establishment of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council
''comprising the Local Government Councils of the three Hill Districts''. It has
22 members and its tenure is five years. The Regional Council Chairman, who
shall be a tribal and who has the status of a state minister, as well as other
members of the Regional Council are elected by the members of the three Hill
District Councils. Pending the formation of an elected Regional Council, its
responsibilities are discharged by an interim Regional Council appointed by the
Government.
Two thirds of the Regional Council members (12 male, 2
female) will be elected from the amongst the tribal population with a special
quota for each tribe. With regard to male members, there will be 5 from the
Chakma tribe, 3 from the Marma tribe, 2 from the Tripura tribe, 1 from the
Murong and Tanchowanga tribes, and 1 from the Lusai, Bwom, Pangkho, Hkumi, Chak
and Kaiang tribes. One female member is elected from the Chakma and another from
the rest of the tribes.
One third of Regional Council members (6 male, 1
female) will be elected from the non-tribal population of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts with members of each of the three Hill District Councils electing two
male members of the Regional Council. There are no geographical conditions
attached to the election of the non-tribal female member.(5)
The Regional
Council has a coordinating function with regard to the development activities in
the three Hill Districts, general administration, law and order, NGO activities,
disaster management, and relief programs; its decision ''in the event of lack of
harmony or any inconsistency being found in the discharge of responsibilities
given to the three District Councils'' will be final.(6)
4.1 Legal
issues: Article C.9.e of the accord states: ''Tribal Law and Community
adjudication shall be within the jurisdiction of the Regional Council.'' Under
Articles C.11 & 13 any legislation inconsistent with the ''Local Government
Council Act of 1989" shall be removed by law on advice and recommendations from
the Regional Council. Any new law in connection with the Chittagong Hill Tracts
will be enacted in consultation and on advice of the Regional
Council.
4.2 General amnesty: The accord does not provide amnesty
to the army and police personnel for past human rights violations, but there is
no commitment in the accord that past human rights violations by the law
enforcement personnel or the Bengali settler groups close to the army will be
addressed. Furthermore, a general amnesty extended in the accord to the former
members of the Shanti Bahini has, if anything, undermined the principle
that anyone - from any side of the conflict - found to have been engaged in
human rights abuses should be brought to justice.
The amnesty is extended
to the Shanti Bahini members who have surrendered their arms as well as
to all PCJSS members. It provides for the withdrawal of all warrants of arrests,
cases against them, court sentences passed as well as for the release of any of
their jailed members.
4.3 Rehabilitation: The Accord provides for
the rehabilitation of tribal refugees and internally displaced tribals, a land
survey in consultation with the Regional Council to ''finally determine land
ownership of the tribal people through settling the land-disputes on proper
verification and shall record their lands and ensure their rights thereto''
(Article D.2). Disputes will be settled by a Land Commission with a minimum
tenure of three years to ''resolve the disputes in consonance with the law,
custom and practice in force in the Chittagong Hill Tracts''. Article D.4
states:
''A commission (Land Commission) shall be constituted under the
leadership of a retired Justice for settlement of disputes regarding lands and
premises. This Commission shall, in addition to early disposal of land disputes
of the rehabilitated refugees, have full authority to annul the rights of
ownership of those hills and lands which have been illegally settled and in
respect of which illegal dispossession has taken place. No appeal shall be
maintainable again the judgement this commission and the decision of this
commission shall be deemed to be final.''
The accord commit both sides to
''uphold the characteristics of tribal creed and culture''. It commits the
government to take back in phases all temporary camps of the army and the
Village Defence Force after the return of PCJSS members ''to normal life''. All
job vacancies are to be filled by the permanent dwellers of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts with priority given to the tribals.
Finally, under the accord a
Ministry for the Chittagong Hill Tracts is established with a minister appointed
from the tribal people. An Advisory Committee comprising the Minister for
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Chairman/Representative of the Regional Council,
Chairman/representative of each of the three Hill District Councils, the three
members of parliament for the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the three tribal chiefs,
and three non-tribal members from among the permanent resident in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts will be established ''to lend support to this
Ministry.''
5. The process of implementation
Although the
government has amended existing laws to provide for the implementation of the
peace accord, the accord is facing a number of difficulties which require urgent
and continued attention. The first one is the slow pace of implementation by the
government. Concern over this has been raised by the international community, by
the human rights groups in and outside Bangladesh, and by the tribal people of
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, at times threatening to derail the peace process
altogether.
The second issue is that the accord is not recognized by the
main opposition party, the BNP led by Begum Khaleda Zia. Although the process of
achieving peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts began at the time of the BNP
government, the BNP has distanced itself from the accord which was finalized
under the Awami League government, amid fears that should a future BNP
government take office, it may seek to repeal the Awami League enacted
legislation that uphold the accord.
Sadly, the peace accord has like many
other important issues in the country been caught in the cross confrontation of
Bangladesh party politics. The government has not missed the opportunity to
utilize it as a mark of its own success; and the opposition has not missed the
opportunity to decry the accord as a mark of the government's
failure.
The BNP has on occasions staged street protests against the
peace accord which it considers to be a loss of Bangladesh sovereignty. The
BNP's boycott of the parliament meant that it did not take part in the debate or
the vote on the accord related legislation. A move to guarantee the accord
through constitutional provisions would have gone some way to allay fears of its
arbitrary derailment in the future, but the government has not moved in that
direction.
A third issue is the position of the disaffected political
groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts who consider the accord to have failed to
respond to their aspiration of full autonomy. These include Pahari Gano
Parishad (PGP or Hill Peoples Council), Pahari Chattra Parishad (PCP
or Hill Students Council) and Hill Women Federation (HWF) who argue that the
accord has failed to ''reflect the genuine hopes and aspirations of the peoples
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and has failed to fulfill the main demands of the
Jumma people namely, constitutional recognition to the national ethnic
minorities of the CHT with guarantee for Full Autonomy [sic], restoration of
traditional land rights, demilitarisation of the area, and withdrawal and
resettlement of the Bengali settlers in the plain land.''(7)
These
perspectives have the potential to aggravate local issues and increase the
tension between the CHT communities inherent in any post-conflict situations.
They could affect questions relating to the withdrawal of the army from certain
camps which, despite the provisions of the accord, has been only partially
implemented; the possession of land which continues to remain unresolved; the
CHT seats in the parliament which have traditionally gone to the national
parties providing them with an effective vehicle to impose their own political
agenda in the area which could now be at variance with the policies of the
Regional Council; and the judicial processes which the tribal people are
reluctant to use due to years of mistrust and which the more litigant non-tribal
people could use to settle their differences with the tribal
people.
Tribal authorities have complained that the decisions of the
Implementation Committee which met four times between March and November 1998
were not implemented and the process has been further confused by the fact that
the committee did not record the minutes of its proceedings . They also complain
that responsibility for collecting the Land Development Tax has not been
transferred from Deputy Commissioners representing the government to the
Regional Council; there have been no meaningful attempts to harmonize respective
administrative functions of the government and the Regional Council; internally
displaced persons have not been fully rehabilitated; the government has neither
increased the number of stipends for tribal students in educational institutions
nor has it provided scholarships for higher education and research in foreign
countries; and although the Ministry for the Chittagong Hill Tracts has been
established, the Advisory Committee through which the Regional Council could
have more say in the decisions made by the government has not been
constituted.
5.1 General amnesty
Under the accord, about 2,000
PCJSS fighters surrendered their arms to the government by 5 March 1998 and the
Shanti Bahini was considered to have been disbanded. Most criminal cases
against former Shanti Bahini members on grounds of armed political
activity including ''waging war against Bangladesh'' were dropped as provided
for by the accord. The government's position with regard to several of such
cases which are still pending has remained unclear.
Shanti Bahini
members officially handing in their arms, 1998 © Philip Gain.
5.2
Repatriation
Repatriation of tribal refugees began after an agreement in
1994 between the BNP government and the Jumma Refugee Welfare Association (JRWA)
representing Chittagong Hill Tracts tribal refugees in camps in the bordering
Indian state of Tripura. Around 5,000 refugees returned home that year, but the
repatriation program was stalled after refugee leaders alleged Bangladesh was
not fulfilling its promises. Under another agreement signed between tribal
activists and a Bangladesh negotiating team from Dhaka in Tripura on 9 March
1997, tribal refugees agreed to return home. The accord offered an amnesty for
those facing criminal charges, safety assurances and guaranteed job and
financial help to build houses and restore land. The first batch of around 5,000
tribal arrived in the CHT town of Ramgarh on 28 March 1997. All of the tribal
refugees in the Indian state of Tripura - some 64,000 people - have returned to
the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
The majority of the repatriated tribal
refugees have been able to regain possession of their lands with assistance from
the government and through peaceful personal efforts or legal means. However, a
substantial number [figures not available] of Jumma refugees are still believed
to be without land. Many have not received all the items in the repatriation
package including several temples or tribal villages currently occupied by the
non-tribal people.
Refugees from the Kaptai Dam displacement who went to
Indian state of Mizoram east of Chittagong Hill Tracts now live in Arunachal
Pradesh in India. Their attempts at getting Indian citizenship have to date been
unsuccessful. Amid reports that the government might be seeking to evict them
from the state, the Supreme Court of India ruled about two years ago that Chakma
people living in Arunachal Pradesh were Indian citizens. While the judgement has
ensured their stay in India, it does not necessarily guarantee citizenship
rights to the Chakmas but negotiations to achieve that are underway between the
Chakmas and the Government.
5.3 The Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs)
People displaced between August 1975 and August 1992 are
considered IDPs. Some 60,000 tribal people were internally displaced during this
period. They included people whose villages were attacked, whose neighbours were
massacred and whose homes were burnt during army operations. They left
everything behind for safer areas moving to neighbouring villages, to relatives
or started anew in the forest interior. The settlers confiscated their land and
in many instances obtained official certificates of ownership. Internally
displaced tribals represent a significant portion of the tribal population and
their rehabilitation will continue to be a major task.
A committee to
facilitate their rehabilitation has been set up, but it is not known what
measures have been taken in this regard. One major problem is to determine the
ownership of tribal land. This ranges from privately registered land and lands
under customary and prescriptive ownership neither of which is marked in public
records. IDPs reportedly continue to have little access to farming lands,
non-farm dwellings, safe drinking water and sanitation facilities, healthcare
and education. The economic rehabilitation of the IDPs has not yet begun in
earnest.
5.4 Commission on Land
This commission is to function
as a special tribunal for the return of land taken away from the tribal people
by the Bengali settlers or the security forces. The commission was officially
formed by the government after the signing of the accord but as of mid-1999, it
had not met and the details of its terms of reference had not been drawn up.
According to reports, after the death of the commission's chairman, Justice
(Rtd.) Anwarul Haq Chowdhury, the government had not appointed a new
chairman.
5.5 Army camps
There are several hundred
non-permanent military camps with some 20,000 soldiers spread all over the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. Although the accord provides for the withdrawal of such
military camps, so far, only 32 temporary army camps have been
lifted.
A military camp on a hill top in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, 1998© Philip Gain.
6. Recent human rights
violations
The current human rights scene is marked by the memories of
human rights violations including massacres of tribal civilians, burning of
their homes, arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial executions and
''disappearances'' reportedly perpetrated by or with the connivance of the
Bangladesh law enforcement personnel during the years of armed conflict.(8) It
is further marked by the failure of Bangladeshi Governments to bring to justice
those responsible for these human rights violations. Past incidents of gross
human rights violations have rarely been investigated. In a few cases when
official commissions of inquiry have been set up and responsibility for
violations were believed to have been established, the reports were not made
public and no action was taken against any army personnel
involved.
During the years of negotiations, particularly in 1996 and
1997, there were significantly fewer reports of human rights violations from the
CHT. This was probably due to measures on the part of the government to ensure
more effective control of the law enforcement personnel in the area especially
at a time when the Shanti Bahini was abiding by its own declared
cease-fire.
Since the signing of the accord on 2 December 1997, new
political pressure points have added to the old tension between the tribal
people and the settlers. These include the tension between the main tribal
group, PCJSS which signed the peace accord with the government and some smaller
dissident groups who oppose the peace accord arguing that it does not go far
enough. Each of the two sides in the CHT accuse the other of targeting its
members. For instance, the dissident groups say they have been targets of
arbitrary arrests by the police with the active connivance of the PCJSS. They
claim that their members have at times been arrested on false accusations by the
PCJSS which has then handed them over to the police which has then detained them
arbitrarily and subjected them to torture. On the other hand, PCJSS claims that
its members have been the targets of kidnapping and killings by the dissident
groups.
At the same time, incidents have occurred that are reminiscent of
past army practices which resulted in the killing of tribal people and setting
their homes on fire.
Amnesty International believes that in an atmosphere
of charged political distrust, it is imperative that every incident of alleged
human rights abuse - be it attributed to the army, the police, the PCJSS or the
dissident groups - is investigated by an independent, impartial and competent
body to establish the facts and identify the perpetrators. The authorities
should then ensure that those found responsible are brought to
justice.
The cases cited below should serve as starting point for such
inquiries but by no means their only subject.
6. 1 Arrest of
dissident activists
On 10 March 1998, four students, Dharma Joyti Chakma
(26), Bplob Chakma (18), Pravat Kusum Chakma (22) and Jatiu Chakma (20) were
arrested in Dhiginala in Khagrachari. They were severely beaten by the police.
Some 200 people from the Hill Student Council (see section 5 above) were
gathering but the police attacked them with tear gas and batons. More than 10
people were injured from among whom four were arrested. After one day in
detention, they were sent to Khagrachari hospital for treatment. However, the
hospital where the prisoners were held for a day reportedly did not keep their
medical record. The prisoners were then sent back to the jail but the record of
this transfer too was reportedly not kept.
Visitors seeing the injured
prisoners in hospital testified to Amnesty International that the prisoners were
then in a critical situation and could not move in their beds. They were part of
a group of about 30 prisoners who were arrested, but the majority had been
released shortly. The four prisoners were held from March until November 1998
and were then released on bail, with cases still pending against them including
the allegation that they had beaten police personnel.
On 18 March 1998
Sanchoy Chakma and Dharuba Joyti were arrested under section 54 of the code of
criminal procedure which allows for detention without a warrant of arrest. They
were charged with two criminal cases which were later reportedly dismissed by
the Khagrachari Magistrate Court for lack of evidence. Sanchoy Chakma is former
president of the Hill Students Council and Dhurba is General Secretary of Hill
People's Council (see section 5 above). They had given several interviews in
weeks before their arrest, criticising the accord. Their lawyer had submitted a
petition in the High Court arguing that there were no reasonable grounds for
their continued detention. The High Court accepted the argument, and the
prisoners were released. Of the two cases against them, the charge of kidnapping
was dropped and the charge of burning a bus appears to have been dismissed after
their release as the two former prisoners have not been summoned to the court in
this connection. They were released on 3 December 1998.
It was reported
to Amnesty International that as of mid-1999, about 18 political prisoners
belonging to the dissident groups remained in Khagrachari and Bandarban jails.
Fifteen including the four injured students transferred to the Chittagong
hospital were reportedly held in Khagrachari jail and three in Bandarban jail
including Dipayan Khisha. There were no reports of political prisoners being
held in Rangamati jail.
6.2 Killings at Babu Chara Bazar
One
incident represents a stark reminder of tactics used by the army in the past
condoning reprisal attacks on the Jumma people by army personnel and non-tribal
settlers. According to reports, three people were killed in at Babu Chara Bazar
in Dighinala Thana area of Khagrachari on 16 October 1999 in a clash between the
army personnel and the Jummas. The clash reportedly occurred after an incident
in which a Bangladeshi army personnel allegedly molested a Jumma woman. The
woman shouted at him and the army personnel and another colleague who came to
defend him were beaten by a number of young Jumma people. Subsequently, a
contingent of army personnel came to the area aided by some 150 Bengali settlers
and jointly attacked the Jummas in the Bazar. Two Jummas, Dipon Joyoti Chakma, a
high school student, and Sukamal Chakma died of their injuries while the body of
a Jumma man who was believed to have been killed during the attack was
discovered in a nearby muddy paddy. Three Jumma homes were reportedly set on
fire, Benuban Buddhist Temple was ransacked, Buddhist monks were ill-treated and
statues of Buddha were damaged. Although the government is reported to have set
up an inquiry into the incident, no news about its progress or outcome has
emerged so far raising fears that this incident will not be properly
investigated and those found responsible punished.
6.3 Allegations of
human rights abuses by dissident groups
The Prasit-Sanchoy group
was suspected of carrying out attacks on a PCJSS member. One such attack was
reportedly carried out on 12 December 1999. One victim was reportedly Manin
Chakma(37) alias Tarjen, son of Laxmi Chandra Chakma in Banghaltuli village in
Baghaichari Thana area of Rangamati. The gunmen surrounded his house, fired at
him and shot him dead. Manin was reportedly an active member of PCJSS, a former
Shanti Bahini member who had together with others surrendered his arms
after the signing of the peace accord. According to PCJSS, he was the fifth
victim of the attacks allegedly carried out by Prasit-Sanchoy groups since the
signing of the accord.
7. Amnesty International's recommendations to
the authorities in Bangladesh and Chittagong Hill Tracts
Respect for
human rights should be central to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. This requires, inter alia, the re-establishment of the
rule of law, an active role for civil society institutions including a fully
independent judiciary and a free press. The following recommendations should be
taken into account:
Policing
• Law enforcement personnel should
be fully trained in international human rights and criminal justice standards
and their duty to adhere to them at all times.
• There should be
monitoring of police operations by an independent body investigating complaints
and making recommendations to the authorities on steps for the protection of
human rights. No one should be arrested arbitrarily on account of peaceful
political activity or peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression.
Torture and ill-treatment must be prevented at all times and those found
responsible for such abuse duly punished.
• Policing arrangements should
reflect the diversity of communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
• The
standards for permissible use of force during arrest and detention by the police
should be tightened to meet international standards. To prevent extrajudicial
executions, police should only be authorized to use force when strictly
necessary and the intentional lethal use of firearms by law enforcement
officials may only be resorted to when strictly unavoidable in order to protect
life.
Judiciary
• Technical assistance and adequate funding
should be provided for ensuring proper dispensation of justice.
• Judges,
prosecutors, law enforcement personnel and other relevant authorities should be
trained to apply important human rights standards concerning law enforcement and
criminal justice. These texts and relevant laws should be translated into the
languages spoken in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
• Laws in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts should be revised to meet international human rights standards,
notably those dealing with arrest and detention and the use of permissible
force.
Impunity
• A special independent and impartial
commission should be established to investigate past human rights violations by
all sides. Its findings should be made public and all those found responsible
for abuse should be prosecuted.
• There should be no immunity for past
human rights violations and no amnesties should prevent those responsible for
grave human rights violations or violations of humanitarian law from being
brought to justice.
Promotion and protection of human rights
•
A legal expert (or panel of legal experts) with proven expertise in human rights
and humanitarian law should assist the Chair of the Regional Council.
•
The National Human Rights Commission should be established as a matter of
priority and be given adequate resources to monitor the human rights situation
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and recommend appropriate action.
• Funding
should be provided for education programs promoting non-discrimination and human
rights in schools and among the general public.
• Organizations should be
supported which provide long-term care and support for the victims of violations
of human rights and humanitarian law.
Appendix
A summary of Amnesty International's
concerns in the Chittagong Hill Tracts over the past 15
years
1984: Members of the Shanti Bahini units killed
at least 77 Bengali settlers at Bhusanchara, near Barkal, and close to the
Indian border. The incident was widely covered in the Bangladesh news media. The
following day tribal families living in six mouzas (an administrative
unit comprising a few villages) in Barkal area were reportedly attacked by army
forces. At least 110 villagers were said to have been killed, but no coverage
was given to the incident by the domestic news media. In June, soldiers
reportedly fired on unarmed civilians, a few dozen of whom were gathered at one
villager's home for a private celebration.
1985: Members of the
tribal population were reportedly subjected to continuing arbitrary arrest,
torture and unlawful killing. Following an amnesty for tribal opponents
announced by the Bangladesh Government in 1983 some Shanti Bahini (Peace
Force) members had surrendered and several dozen others had been released from
jail. However, fighting between one faction of the Shanti Bahini and law
enforcement personnel continued. In September Amnesty International publicized
its appeal to the Bangladesh Government for an inquiry into human rights
violations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, citing killings and torture which had
reportedly occurred in 1984 when several young women had been arbitrarily killed
during operations conducted by the security forces in Barkalak, Harinhatchara
and Hoyalchara, in the Zurochari area in September 1984. Tribal villagers were
reported to have been tortured in police camps at Mohalchari, Ranga Panichara
and Bakchari, and in army camps at Bhaibhonchara and Thalchara in the same
period. Army operation during 1985 resulted in dozens of villagers being beaten,
and in some cases, arrested, especially in the Khagrachari area where the
Shanti Bahini had engaged in clashes with law enforcement personnel.
Tribal villagers in the Panchari area were said to have been arbitrarily
arrested and ill-treated in late November and early
December.
1986: In October Amnesty International published a
report -Bangladesh: unlawful killings and torture in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts - which detailed extrajudicial killings and torture of non-combatant
tribal people reportedly committed by military and paramilitary personnel. Many
of the incidents described took place in the first half of 1986. Amnesty
International acknowledged that the armed opposition group, the tribal Shanti
Bahini had killed non-tribal residents in the area and emphasized its
condemnation of the execution of prisoners by anyone, including opposition
groups. Among the reported extrajudicial killings by law enforcement personnel
which Amnesty International described were killings attributed to the Bangladesh
Rifles (BDR) on 18 or 19 May near the Indian border post at Silacherri. A group
of some 200 tribal people were said to be approaching the border to cross into
India, having left their villages following military operations in the locality
in early May. They were reportedly apprehended by troops of the 31st
battalion of the BDR, who were said to have surrounded them and made them walk
into a narrow valley. In this restricted space, the soldiers are reported to
have fired indiscriminately, killing and unknown number of unarmed people. The
report also contained testimonies from tribal villagers describing being
tortured during interrogation at army and BDR camps. Prisoners were reported to
have been kept for several days in pits or trenches within the camps's
perimeters and questioned about the whereabouts of Shanti Bahini units.
The most frequently cited methods of torture were having hot water poured into
the mouth and nostrils, being hung upside down and beaten and being burned with
cigarettes. Amnesty International called upon the government to establish and
impartial, independent commission of inquiry to investigate this and other
reports of unlawful killings and torture by the security forces, and to publish
its findings. At the end of 1986 the government sent Amnesty International a
response to its report stating that all allegations of human rights abuse were
investigated and appropriate action taken against those responsible. On 21
December Amnesty International replied, asking for specific information on the
nature and findings of the inquiries the government said it had conducted. It
also requested further details of three incidents in May during which people
were reportedly killed unlawfully. Amnesty International also expressed concern
about reports that following an attack on army personnel by Shanti Bahini
forces in the area in mid-October, tribal people had been tortured during
interrogation by military personnel at the sports stadium at Rangamati. Later in
the month tribal men from a village in Khagrachari district, where Shanti
Bahini units were understood to have been active, were reportedly beaten in
Bet Chari army camp.
1987: Killings of law enforcement personnel
and others by the armed tribal opposition the Shanti Bahini continued. In
late 1986 and the opening weeks of 1987 there were renewed reports of human
rights violations there in the course of intensive security force operations in
the northern districts. For the remainder of the year, however, there were
markedly fewer of these reports than during the preceding 12
months.
According to reports received early in the year, some 40 members of
the security forces, accompanied by non-tribal civilians, surrounded a tribal
village on 29 December 1986 and set fire to the huts of tribal people. Several
women from Bouripara village, in Panchari sub-district, were reportedly raped by
non-tribal men while the security forces looked on, and two of the tribal men
were alleged to have been killed. Some others were reported to have been beaten
and two to have been hung upside down from a tree where burning wood was
producing a choking smoke. One woman related that she witnessed her husband's
death: she said he was beaten and then stabbed by a member of the security
forces.
The conflict resulted in thousands of tribal villagers crossing into
India in 1986 and early 1987. By mid-February, Indian officials were estimating
their number at some 40,000 and the Bangladesh Government at approximately
25,000. The two governments discussed procedures for their formal repatriation
but without result by the end of the year, although a small number of tribal
villagers were reported by the Bangladesh news media to have returned
voluntarily.
1988: There were further attacks on law enforcement
personnel and others by the armed tribal opposition Shanti Bahini (Peace
Force) which resulted in a number of deaths and other casualties. In August the
security forces and non-tribal settlers assisting them were alleged by the PCJSS
to have killed over 300 people in Baghai Chari sub-district in retaliatory
raids. They were also alleged to have raped several women and girls and to have
burnt the houses of suspected supporters of the Shanti Bahini. The
government informed Amnesty International that an official inquiry into the
incident had found that strife between tribal and non-tribal communities in the
area had been exacerbated by ''inept handling of the situation'' by the local
administration following an attack on the Security Forces by the Shanti
Bahini. It said that some insurgent had been killed in an exchange with the
security forces, that ''a few tribals'' were injured during the ''civil
commotion'' which followed, and that one tribal person later died in hospital as
a result of an injury. The government said that compensation would be paid to
tribal people affected by the strife. No mention was made of anyone being held
criminally responsible for the death. Amnesty International was not able to
gather independent information on this incident.
Following negotiations
between the government and some tribal leaders new arrangements for the district
administration of the Chittagong Hill Tracts were announced in November and were
due to be implemented in 1989. The PCJSS opposed the agreement and a tribal
leader who had been involved in negotiations with the government was killed in
December, allegedly by the Shanti Bahini.
At the end of the year, tens
of thousands of tribal refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts remained in
India, and negotiations between the governments of India and Bangladesh on
procedures for their repatriation continued without result. The Bangladesh press
reported that small numbers of tribal villagers had returned voluntarily during
the year.
In January an Amnesty International delegation visited Bangladesh
and discussed human rights violations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with
President Ershad and other members of the government as well as with the
authorities directly responsible for security in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In
particular, Amnesty International sought information about official
investigations into past reports of human rights violations by the security
forces including arbitrary arrests of people suspected of political offences,
torture and extrajudicial executions. The organization stressed the need for all
such inquiries to be both impartial and independent. During the visit, the
authorities undertook to provide Amnesty International with further information
about six specific incidents which had been reported: subsequently the
government informed Amnesty International that three of the six incidents had
not occurred and that the others were a result of communal conflict, not
security force action. However, no details of the investigations in these
incidents were provided. Some information was provided about the investigation
into the alleged killings in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in August but the
detailed findings of this inquiry were not published.
1989: The
government of President Hossain Mohammad Ershad introduced new legislation in
February providing for elected council with tribal majorities to be established
in the Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban districts of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts. The government declared an amnesty from 23 April, granting immunity
against prosecution to members of the armed tribal opposition group, the
Shanti Bahini, who surrendered prior to the council elections on 25 June:
there was very little response. The PCJSS opposed the new administrative
arrangements and boycotted the June elections. The Shanti Bahini was
blamed for scores of killings, including the murder of 13 non-tribal people in
Kaptai sub-district in April. It continued its violent opposition to the
government, and attacks on non-combatant civilians in the area, after the
elections. Twelves people (including eight tribal people) were killed when a
bomb exploded on a passenger boat in Naniarchar sub-district in August in an
attack attributed to the Shanti Bahini.
In May at least 36 tribal
villagers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts were reportedly killed by Village
Defence Party (VDP) members and other non-tribal settlers. The VDPs are local
civil defence units recruited, armed and trained by the police to protect their
localities at night. The killings were apparently in reprisal for the murder of
the non-tribal chairperson of Languet council, allegedly by the Shanti
Bahini: between six and 11villages were reportedly attacked. Survivors were
said to have fled to the hills and forests for refuge, and thousands crossed the
border into Tripura in India, joining tens of thousands of refugees who remained
in India from previous years.
After the Languet killings, tribal leader Raja
Debashish Roy was placed under house arrest for three days, preventing him from
attending a Buddhist ceremony to commemorate the dead. The day before his arrest
he and 21 other tribal leaders had submitted a memorandum to the authorities
demanding acting against the perpetrators of the killings.
The government
informed Amnesty International in June that it had investigated the killings and
found that 16 tribal people had been killed by an ''unruly mob''. It said that
over 30 people had been arrested on suspicion of involvement in rioting; the
precise charges were not made known. It suggested that attack was a spontaneous
outburst by non-tribal people reacting to the killing of the Languet council
chairperson, which the security forces had immediately attempted to contain.
However, it did not provide full details of the inquiry, the findings of which
conflict with reports Amnesty International received from other sources. No
trials were known to have taken place by the end of the year in connection with
these killings.
1990: Amnesty International raised with the
government four cases of death in custody which occurred in 1988 and 1989 and
requested information on the inquiry the government said it had initiated into
reprisal killings in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in June 1989. The government
responded in each case, but did not provide evidence that full and impartial
investigations had been held.
1991: The government continued to
face armed opposition in the Chittagong Hill Tracts from the Shanti
Bahini, Peace Force, a group seeking autonomy for the area. The Shanti
Bahini were accused by the authorities of human rights abuses, including
killing unarmed civilians.
Tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where
Shanti Bahini fighters were active, continued to be subjected to human
rights violations by government forces. In one case, soldiers were reportedly
disciplined for the rape of 14 young tribal women at gunpoint. This was the
first time to Amnesty International's knowledge that any action had been taken
by the authorities in a case of rape allegedly committed by security personnel.
It was not clear, however, if criminal proceedings were initiated against the
perpetrators.
Several tribal people were reportedly held in unacknowledged
detention: one, Anil Bikash Chakma, may have been transferred to military
custody after his reported arrest on 3 July but his family had not been able to
trace him by the end of the year.
Several deaths of tribal people in military
custody were reported: Tusher Kanti Chakma, who died in June, was alleged to
have been severely tortured at Ghilachari army camp. His body also bore bullet
wounds.
Amnesty International also urged the authorities to investigate
alleged human rights violations by government forces in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts and to take all possible steps to protect the population there from human
rights violations. However, there was no response.
1992: The
government of Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia appointed a committee in July to
negotiate a political solution in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In August the
Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), the armed group seeking autonomy for the
area, declared a unilateral cease-fire. Talks between the government and tribal
representatives began in November. Abuses of human rights by Shanti
Bahini forces were reported during the year.
Tribal people continued to
be subjected to torture, illegal detention under the Special Powers Act
(SPA) and extrajudicial executions. On 10 April over 100 tribal people
were reportedly killed in Logang, apparently in reprisal for the killing of a
Bengali boy by Shanti Bahini fighters. Paramilitary security forces
reportedly set fire to the village and shot dead those attempting to escape. The
BDR arrived later, but reportedly did not attempt to stop the killing. The
government later admitted that 12 tribal villagers were killed and 13 injured in
the incident by paramilitary forces acting together with Bengali civilians. An
official inquiry confirmed these figures. Some of those apparently responsible
for the extrajudicial executions were said to be in custody but it was not known
whether any of them had been prosecuted by the end of 1992.
In May Amnesty
International published a report, Bangladesh: Reprisal killings in Logang,
Chittagong Hill Tracts, in April 1992, and called for a full and impartial
inquiry into the incident.
1993: Several rounds of talks between
representatives of the tribal population and the government took place, but no
political solution was found to end years of strife. Cease-fire agreements and
amnesties for tribal militants who surrendered to the authorities were
periodically extended. In May an agreement was signed with India for the
repatriation of over 50,000 tribal refugees from camps in Tripura. The refugees
refused to leave when the Bangladeshi Government failed to provide guarantees
for their safety or for international supervision of the repatriation
process.
Sanchoy Chakma, a tribal student leader, was arrested without
warrant on 16 March; police interrogated him about human rights training he had
received abroad. Eight days later he was served with a 120-day detention order
under the SPA. He was a prisoner of conscience. On 6 April he was
informed that he was being charged with ''being a spokesman of an anti-state
people''. However, he was released uncharged and untried on 25 May after the
government revoked his detention order.
Violations of tribal people's human
rights continued to be reported. Dozens of tribal people were arbitrarily
detained under the SPA. Several people were believed to have been
extrajudicially executed on 17 November in Naniarchar, in Rangamati district,
when a demonstration organized by tribal students was attacked by Bengali
settlers and the army opened fire on the demonstrators. Officials said 13 people
died, including 12 tribal people, but local human rights groups said that over
20 people had been killed. The Home Minister announced that an inquiry
commission would investigate the incident but there had been no progress by the
end of the year.
In July the government said that criminal proceedings had
been initiated against eight people, including members of the paramilitary
forces, for their alleged participation in the killings in April 1992 in Logang
(see Amnesty International Report 1993); one member of the paramilitary
BDR who had been involved in the Logang incident was dismissed for ''mishandling
the excited non-tribals'', according to an official report.
In April Amnesty
International published a report, Bangladesh: A summary of human rights
concerns, which described unlawful detention of political prisoners,
torture, extrajudicial executions and the use of the death penalty in 1992 and
1993. The government stated that it would investigate Amnesty International's
allegations. However, there was no information to indicate that the government
had taken any action by the end of the year.
When an agreement to repatriate
refugees to the Chittagong Hill Tracts was signed with India in June, Amnesty
International expressed its concern that insufficient measures had been provided
to protect the human rights of returning refugees.
In a written statement to
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in July, Amnesty
International described its long-term concerns regarding killings of defenceless
tribal villagers by government forces in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts.
1994: Several rounds of talks between government and
tribal representatives failed to bring a political solution. A cease-fire was
periodically extended and sometimes broken. Following an agreement between India
and Bangladesh, repatriation of some of the 56,000 tribal refugees from India
began in February when over 1,800 people returned. Around 3,300 more refugees
returned in July and August, even though land and homes had been restored to
only a few of the returning refugees. A demand by tribal representatives for
international supervision of their repatriation and rehabilitation was not
conceded. A commission set up to investigate the possible extrajudicial
execution of 12 to 20 tribal people in Naniarchar in November 1993 (see Amnesty
International Report 1994) had not published its report by the end of
1994.
1995: Talks between the government and tribal
representatives failed to bring a political solution to the long-standing
conflict between non-Bengali tribal inhabitants and the government, but the
cease-fire was periodically extended. The repatriation of some 50,000 tribal
refugees living in camps in India was not restarted. The government rejected
demands by the tribal population that their repatriation should be placed under
international supervision.
There were continuing reports of ill-treatment,
harassment and arbitrary detention of tribal people with the acquiescence or
active participation of the police. In March a demonstration of tribal students
in Bandarban was stopped by a group of non-tribal settlers who then looted and
burned down the homes of some 300 tribal families. Police reportedly stood by
without attempting to protect the lives and property of tribal people. During
the incident, 12 police officers beat and injured a Buddhist monk, Waiyzo Marma,
his wife and a visitor when he denied sheltering tribal activists. Later that
day, 22 tribal students, including a 15-year-old girl, were arrested and
allegedly beaten. Eight were released on bail within three weeks but four were
held for five months before obtaining bail.
1996: In October, the
government announced the establishment of a National Committee on the Chittagong
Hill Tracts to find a lasting solution to the conflict there, but no major
breakthrough in talks between the government and tribal representatives was
reported. A periodically extended cease-fire was broken on several occasions
throughout the year.
Kalpana Chakma, a tribal women's rights activist,
reportedly ''disappeared'' in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in June. Security
personnel reportedly took her from her home. A government-appointed commission
of inquiry had not reported its findings by the end of the year and her
whereabouts remained unknown.
Amnesty International also called for the fate
and whereabouts of Kalpana Chakma to be established and for the institution of
impartial and independent inquiries into all reports of human rights
violations.
1997: Talks between the government and tribal
representatives to bring about a political solution to the long-standing
conflict resulted in the signing of a peace accord in December. Under an
agreement between tribal leaders and government officials, the phased
repatriation of around 50,000 refugees living in camps in India began in March
and continued in November. Some 12,000 refugees had returned to the CHT by the
end of the year.
The whereabouts of Kalpana Chakma, a tribal women's rights
activist who reportedly ''disappeared'' in the CHT in June 1996, remained
unknown. A government-appointed commission of inquiry into the case was
understood to have submitted its final report to the government in February, but
its findings had not been made public by the end of the
year.
1998: Steps were taken to implement the peace accord reached
by the government and tribal representatives. Throughout February members of the
armed opposition group Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) surrendered their
weapons in exchange for an amnesty and rehabilitation. In May parliament passed
legislation for the establishment of a regional council granting more political
autonomy to the area. By the end of the year the last of some 50,000 refugees
living in camps in India had been repatriated to the
CHT.
****
(1) A brief, year-by-year account of human rights
violations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts as documented by Amnesty International
is annexed to this report.
(2) Population statistics for the year 1951 showed
the proportion of tribal to non-tribal inhabitants to be around 91 per cent and
nine per cent respectively. By 1974, the percentage of the non-tribals had
increased to 11.5. In 1980, they accounted for almost 34 percent and by
mid-1980s non-tribal settlers were believed to be almost equal in number to the
tribal inhabitants.
(3) The exact number of villagers killed is not
available, but estimates from tribal sources vary from 50 to over 200.
(4) JB
Larma, the current leader of the PCJSS succeeded Manobendra Narayan Larma who
was killed in an intra-party conflict in 1983.
(5) see: The Agreement between
the National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts constituted by the Government
and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti [CHT Peace Accord], 2 December
1997, Chapter C, Articles 1-7.
(6) The CHT Peace Accord, Articles 9,a,b,c,d
and f.
(7) PGP, PCP and HWF (joint statement), "Why we oppose
Government-PCJSS agreement on Chittagong Hill Tracts", 4 May 1998.
(8) A year
by year summary of human rights violations documented by Amnesty International
is given as an annex to this paper to provide the basis for a thorough
investigation of these reports and administration of justice to the perpetrators
of these violations.
Source: Amnesty International